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All Pacific Island countries have embraced policy and management reform - both in 
rhetoric and practice – as the central strategy for enhancing economic development and 
effective governance. Donor support and encouragement for this strategy over the past 
decade has been substantial. Yet reforms have proven difficult to implement in most 
countries and only partial success can be claimed. Why is reform so elusive? In the 
course of two recent consultancies undertaken for the FAO in Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu, Dr Jim Fingleton observed a wide range of obstacles and difficulties, structural 
and behavioural, that have inhibited the progress of reform. Impediments encountered 
included: 
 
o absence of a political mandate for change and reform 
o political and bureaucratic inertia, obstruction and “interference” 
o lack of coordination and continuity in bureaucratic processes 
o disconnections between the public and private sectors 
o stakeholder dissonance 
o unrealistic expectations of consultants and donor interventions, and 
o inappropriate donor programs and timeframes. 
 
While many of these obstacles are common throughout the Pacific region (indeed 
throughout the developing world), others are specific to individual countries. Dr 
Fingleton’s identification of these constraints within their national contexts assists our 
understanding of the inherent difficulties of the reform process. In addition, his close 
analysis of experience on these projects demonstrates some pointed lessons for domestic 
reformers, donors and consultants alike. One such lesson, he argues, is that aid projects 
and consultants cannot be used as a substitute for government policymaking - if reforms 
are to endure and responsible government is to have any meaning. A second is that, in 
the absence of functioning political parties and other mechanisms linking the populace to 
policy, the legitimacy of reform policy can be enhanced best by a wide consultative 
process. But even that is no guarantee of successful policy implementation: powerful 
vested interests may still override popularly-endorsed programs. 
 
• Dr Jim Fingleton is a development law consultant with over 30 years 
experience as a government practitioner and independent consultant 
mainly on land, agriculture, and forestry issues in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
II.  
In 1999, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) received 
the 
following requests from two Pacific Islands countries for technical assistance –  
 
• from the Government of Papua New Guinea (PNG), to reform the legal and 
      institutional arrangements for management of the agriculture sector  
• from the Government of Vanuatu, to rewrite the forestry legislation to enable 
      implementation of a new national forest policy.   
 
I was engaged by FAO to lead a small team of consultants to carry out the two projects. 
The purpose of this paper is to outline my experience in conducting these two 
consultancies during 1999-2000, and discuss the implications for present-day law- and 
policy-making in the Pacific Islands. I will first describe the background of the 
consultancy in each country, its conduct and the results achieved. Then I will mention the 
problems faced in doing the two consultancies, and conclude with my views on the 
lessons to be learned from the experience. 
 
I was nominated by FAO and accepted by the two Governments to undertake these 
consultancies on the basis of my relevant experience in the two countries concerned. I 
have worked as an adviser to government in PNG for nearly 30 years, during the 1970s as 
adviser on land policy and legislation to the National Government over the independence 
transition period (1973-78), and since then as a consultant to the National and Provincial 
Governments on a range of land, forestry and environmental projects. I also advised the 
Vanuatu Government on land legislation during its transition to independence (1980-81), 
and returned in 1997 to take part in a study of the country's potential for private forestry.  
 
II. PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
 
Background to the consultancy on the Department of Agriculture and Livestock 
 
Before 1980, the Department of Agriculture and Livestock (DAL) had primary 
responsibility right across the agriculture sector - in policy formulation, research, 
extension services, training and agricultural education. From about 1980 the 
Department's role was progressively reduced by two main factors - decentralisation and 
corporatisation. 
 
Devolution of Agricultural Functions to Provinces 
 
The devolution of agricultural functions to provincial level began with the first Organic 
Law on Provincial Government in 1977, and further devolution (in particular, in planning 
and funding powers) to district and community levels was in train at the time of the 
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consultancy, under the recent Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level 
Governments of 1995. New structures were introduced for policy- and law-making, 
administration and public funding. Each of the 20 provinces has a Joint Provincial 
Planning and Budget Priorities Committee, with a corresponding body for each of the 83 
districts. A major shift was made to the direct funding of services at district and local 
levels, with local Members of the National Parliament having an important say over 
planning and expenditure. It is a very ambitious model for decentralisation, and work 
was still being done on sorting out its implementation at the time of the consultancy. 
Corporatisation “reforms” 
 
The other major reform in management of the agriculture sector over recent years has 
been the transfer of responsibility for provision of support services in agriculture from 
government bodies - especially DAL but also from Provincial Divisions of Primary 
Industry (DPIs) - to industry organisations. A basic thrust of this reform was to create 
organisations controlled by, accountable to, and financed largely by the industries 
themselves, with a view to establishing a work ethos for enhanced efficiency and service 
orientation. 
 
In some cases, the mandate and membership of commodity boards which had been 
established under earlier legislation was altered to give broader industry representation 
and introduce a private sector management approach (e.g. Copra Marketing Board, Cocoa 
Board). In other cases Government-owned companies were incorporated to run 
commercial operations (e.g. Livestock Development Corporation, Fresh Produce 
Development Company), while other corporations were either set up by Government or 
taken over to provide extension services, undertake research or carry out marketing 
functions for particular crops (e.g. Cocoa & Coconut Research Institute, Coffee Industry 
Corporation, Cocoa & Coconut Extension Agency). 
 
Meanwhile, umbrella bodies were being formed by the private sector, such as the peak 
Rural Industries Council with its broad industry representation, the Growers' Association, 
the Smallholder Coffee Growers Associations in the coffee-growing provinces, the Palm 
Oil Producers Association, Poultry Growers Association and so on. Many of these farmer 
bodies have representation on the boards of the industry corporations already mentioned. 
A further stage in the corporatisation thrust was the establishment in 1996 of the National 
Agricultural Research Institute as a statutory organisation to carry out applied research, 
and in 1997 of the National Agriculture Quarantine and Inspection Authority to maintain 
plant and animal protection and carry out quality assurance. 
 
These various bodies, with their different memberships and constituencies, had been set 
up under a range of different legal instruments, with different objects, functions and 
powers, decision-making structures, staffing arrangements and accountability 
requirements. Fairly common features, however, are: 
 
i. the governing bodies (boards, councils, etc) are usually made up of a 
combination 
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of senior Government officials and representatives of the industry concerned; 
ii. the Minister for Agriculture and Livestock has some say in the appointment of 
some or all of the board members; 
iii. the boards are made responsible for overall executive control, but provision is 
made for staff to be appointed to carry out day-to-day administration; 
iv. the board members are subject to conflict-of-interest requirements, and are 
required to meet at regular intervals to carry out their functions; 
v. the Minister is sometimes given power to issue directions to the board, and to 
participate in planning, staff appointments, fixing of grower levies, etc; 
vi. the terms and conditions of appointment of board members and staff are 
sometimes subject to statutory control; 
vii. there is usually some control on how the funds of the organisation are raised 
and 
spent; 
viii. requirements are sometimes made for annual reports and auditing of accounts. 
 
Serious Problems for DAL 
 
As a result of decentralisation and corporatisation, by the end of the 1990s many of 
DAL's traditional functions had either been devolved to provincial or lower levels of 
government, or been transferred to the dozen or so industry organisations. At the start of 
the new century, the agriculture sector faced the following serious problems: 
 
i. DAL, the main government body, was marginalised and demoralised, 
resentful of its loss of power and often in conflict with the agencies carrying 
out its former functions; 
ii. the National Government had no effective vehicle for pursuing national 
priorities - e.g.,, in food security or export crop production; 
iii. funding for agriculture was poorly-targeted, inadequate and unreliable (a 
major problem for research, in particular); 
iv. weak capacity at provincial and local levels of government; 
v. poor accountability by many corporate bodies to their grower constituencies 
for expenditure of crop levies, etc. 
 
A decline in agricultural production was evident, in export crops but also in subsistence 
crops, as the serious food shortages in the late 1990s grimly showed. 
 
A number of aid agencies (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, AusAID, etc) made 
various reform proposals during the 1990s for restructuring DAL and strengthening the 
other institutions. Some aid agencies even began bypassing DAL and providing their 
support directly to bodies within the sector carrying out agricultural research and 
extension services. In 1999, the Government asked FAO to provide technical assistance 
to strengthen DAL's capacity to act as the lead agency in the agriculture sector, and 
improve the legal and institutional arrangements for management of the sector. 
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Methodology and Proposals for Reform 
 
The FAO project team consisted of myself as Team Leader and Legal Expert, and Dr 
Adel Cortas, a retired FAO officer, as the Institutional Expert. A lawyer from FAO's 
Development Law Service in Rome, Dr Jessica Vapnek, joined the mission during its 
latter stages, and took part in the project workshop. 
 
My Terms of Reference required me to advise the Government on the implications of all 
the agriculture-related legislation and the new decentralisation initiatives for management 
of the agriculture sector, and propose legislative reforms to improve arrangements for 
management of the sector. Dr Cortas was required to advise on the restructuring of DAL, 
and ways for improving delivery of services by the various industry bodies. We visited 
PNG twice - for a month in 1999 and again in 2000. We had a Steering Committee of 
senior DAL officials with whom we met weekly, and consultations were held with DAL 
and the other relevant bodies at the national level, four of PNG's nineteen Provincial 
Governments, more than a dozen of the main industry bodies, and the World Bank, 
UNDP, AusAID and New Zealand aid representatives. 
 
After the first mission a Discussion Paper was prepared and distributed, setting out the 
issues as we saw them and our reform proposals. The main issues for DAL's future role, 
and management generally of the agriculture sector, were listed as follows: 
 
i. because many of DAL's traditional functions have either been devolved to 
provincial and lower levels of government, or have been transferred to 
corporations, what is DAL's role to be in the future? 
ii. how can capacity and resources be built up at district level, to support district 
and 
provincial planning? 
iii. how can adequate and reliable funding be provided to the bodies established 
to 
carry out essential agricultural functions (extension, research, marketing, 
quarantine, etc)? 
iv. how can these bodies be made suitably representative of their constituencies, 
and 
fully accountable to them for expenditure and performance? 
v. with management of the agriculture sector now much more fragmented, how 
can 
linkages be established and maintained among all the various parties within 
industry and government? 
 
This Discussion Paper was distributed to the stakeholders, and was used as the basis for a 
major workshop held during the second mission. Representatives from Government, 
industry and the private sector were brought in from around the country to debate the 
reform proposals, and a fair degree of support was gained for them. In June 2000, FAO 
sent reports by Dr Cortas and myself to the Government of Papua New Guinea, with our 
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final recommendations for legal and administrative reform. 
 
 
Major Proposals 
 
The main concern of this paper is the process of reform rather than its actual content, but 
the following gives an outline of the main recommendations sent in our reports to the 
Government by FAO: 
 
i. the private sector should have the main say in management of agriculture; 
ii. DAL should be cut back heavily, and its role redefined to focus on strategic 
planning for the agriculture sector, coordination, and monitoring and 
evaluation; 
iii. planning must be done by DAL in a participatory manner, involving other 
national agencies, Provincial and Local-level Governments, key industry 
bodies 
and statutory corporations. For this purpose, a National Agriculture Council 
should be established, to provide leadership and guidance to proposed 
Provincial 
Agriculture Councils in their planning and budgeting; 
iv. the key agriculture industry bodies should have to comply with a legislated set 
of 
"good governance" principles covering such matters as appointments to their 
boards, the exercise of the Minister's powers, terms and conditions for staff, 
reporting and accountability requirements. 
 
To implement these recommendations, a set of Drafting Instructions for the necessary 
new legislation was included with the final reports, as well as the details for a 
reconstructed DAL. The proposals were based on the mechanisms for planning at the 
different levels of government laid down by the Organic Law, and on the World 
Bankinspired  public sector reforms (in particular, reductions in the size of the public 
sector) 
put in train by the Morauta Government. Models used for the proposed approach were 
the arrangements for coordinated planning set out in the Education Act and National 
Health Administration Act, which provinces said they favoured. Despite these 
institutional underpinnings, and the support given to the reform proposals during our 
consultations, the proposals came unstuck. I will leave treatment of what happened next 
until after I have described the experience in conducting the second consultancy.   
 
III. VANUATU 
 
Background to the consultancy on the new Forestry Act 
 
Shortly after independence, Vanuatu enacted the Forestry Act of 1982. The 1980s and 
1990s were decades when a major increase in forest exploitation occurred in the larger 
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Pacific Islands states, assisted by poor long-term planning by post-independence 
governments for the forestry sector and deregulation of the forest industry. In countries 
like Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands the forest resource was being exploited at 
an unsustainable rate, bad logging practices were ruining the environment, village society 
was being disrupted and the countries were missing out on precious forest revenue. 
Justice Tos Barnett, who ran a Commission of Inquiry into PNG's forestry industry in the 
late 1980s, summed up the results of logging in New Ireland Province in this famous 
quote: 
 
"[T]he accessible timber resource has been vandalised to satisfy the financial 
thirst of foreign timber countries … . It would be fair to say, of some, that they 
are now roaming the countryside with the self-assurance of robber-barons; bribing 
politicians and leaders, creating social disharmony and ignoring laws and policy 
in order to gain access to, rip out, and export the last remnants of the province's 
valuable timber." 
 
Vanuatu’s Conservative Approach to Logging 
 
Vanuatu was spared from the worst damage by its less attractive natural timber resource, 
a more conservative government approach to logging and - probably most important of 
all 
- a legislated ban from 1993 on the export of unprocessed logs. 
 
Vanuatu received development assistance for the forestry sector during the 1980s and 
1990s from New Zealand, the European Union, and from AusAID - most notably in the 
form of the National Forest Inventory Project (1989-92) and the Sustainable Forest 
Utilization Project (1995-2000). One outcome from the latter was the Vanuatu Code of 
Logging Practice, adopted by legislation in 1998. In November 1998, after a 
UNDPfunded 
project the Council of Ministers endorsed the National Forest Policy of Vanuatu - 
a comprehensive statement of national forest policy objectives and the strategies for their 
achievement. This lengthy document was prepared after a series of public policy 
workshops, held around the country in 1996 and 1997. 
 
 
 
National Forest Policy of 1998 
 
 
Among the main elements of the National Forest Policy are: 
i. the principal goal for the forestry sector is to be sustainable management, to 
achieve greater social, economic and environmental benefits for current and 
future generations; 
ii. the National Government is responsible for regulation of the forestry sector, 
but it 
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must consult Provincial Governments on relevant forestry matters; 
iii. forests are to be classified as production, protection, conversion or 
uncommitted 
forests, with suitable controls imposed on forest use for each class; 
iv. the rights of customary owners to decide how their forest resource is to be 
managed are recognised; 
v. there must be better provision for the acquisition of timber rights, and joint 
ventures between logging companies and the customary owners should be 
encouraged; 
vi. a licence from the Government is required for all commercial forestry 
operations; 
vii. licences are to be based on sustainable yields for each island; 
viii. all licences must include provision for reforestation of logged areas; 
ix. the log export ban to be retained, with minimal exceptions; 
x. all forestry fees, penalties and charges must be paid into a Forestry Fund, for 
use on reforestation, administration, research, training and extension. 
 
The Forestry Act of 1982 and its supporting Regulations were seen as needing 
replacement, so as to provide the necessary legislative backing for the new policy and 
strategies. In 1999, the Government asked FAO to provide technical assistance to draft 
the new forestry legislation. 
 
Methodology and Major Proposals 
 
The FAO project team consisted of myself as Team Leader and International Legal 
Consultant, Mr Aru Mathias from FAO's Sub-Regional Office in Western Samoa (a 
former Director of Forests in Vanuatu) and two local consultants. As with the PNG 
consultancy, a lawyer from FAO's Development Law Service in Rome, Dr Ali Mekouar, 
joined the mission during its latter stages, and took part in the project workshop. My 
Terms of Reference required me to review all the forestry-related laws and assess their 
adequacy for sustainable management of the country's forest resource, recommend 
amendments necessary to implement the National Forest Policy, and prepare draft 
legislation to give effect to those reforms. 
 
I visited Vanuatu three times during 2000, and the project team held consultations with 
the Department of Forests and other relevant bodies at national, provincial and village 
levels. A high-level Steering Committee of Government officials was set up to give 
guidance to the project. After the first mission I prepared a report outlining the 
requirements and options for legislative reform to implement the recommendations of the 
National Forest Policy, and this was used as the basis for consultations during the second 
mission, after which I prepared a Discussion Draft of a new Forestry Act and Explanatory 
Notes. These were sent by FAO to the Government, and during the third mission a 2-day 
Training Workshop was held for Forestry officials, and then a 2-day National Seminar, 
attended by representatives from Government, industry, aid organizations and the private 
sector. 
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Main Aspects of the new Forestry Legislation 
 
Once again, it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the content of the reform 
proposals, which emerged from the consultancy in the form of a draft Forestry Act and 
Regulations. I am more concerned here with the process of legal reform, but the 
following are the main aspects of the proposed legislation sent by FAO to the 
Government: 
 
i. the general principles applying to forestry administration are set out; 
ii. a Forests Board is established, with the main task of supervising the 
negotiations 
with customary owners for timber rights agreements; 
iii. provision is made for a Forestry Sector Plan, to be prepared in a consultative 
manner. The Plan is the basic framework for the protection, development and 
sustainable management of all forests in Vanuatu, and forestry operations 
cannot be approved outside of the Plan's requirements; 
iv. the two main requirements for any commercial forestry operation are an 
agreement with the customary owners of the timber and a licence issued by 
the Director of Forests; 
v. the steps to be followed in negotiating a timber rights agreement with the 
customary owners are set out in detail; 
vi. provision is made for environment protection and reforestation; 
vii. export of forest produce is regulated. 
 
A Forestry Bill to implement this draft legislation was approved for introduction to the 
Parliament of Vanuatu in August 2001 and was passed by Parliament in November. 
 
Attention will now be turned to the problems faced in conducting the two consultancies, 
and what lessons can be learnt from the experience. 
 
IV. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
 
Papua New Guinea 
 
Lack of Policy Approval 
 
The basic problem in the PNG case arose from the fact that, although there was general 
agreement on the necessity for improving management of the agriculture sector, no 
policy 
approval for reform had been given. It had been left up to the FAO consultants to make 
their proposals for reform, and these had then to be brought into the country's 
decisionmaking 
process. The normal way for policy approval to be gained would be for the 
Department concerned to prepare a submission for presentation by its Minister to PNG's 
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National Executive Council, but major difficulties lay in the path of this process in this 
case. 
 
In the first place, although the concerned Department - DAL - had put forward the 
original request to FAO for the project, it became clear to us that the only option they 
were interested in was to be "corporatised". In previous years, the two former 
Departments of Fisheries and Forests had been reconstituted as the National Fisheries and 
Forestry Authorities under their own legislation. These statutory bodies have 
considerable financial autonomy and freedom in setting staff terms and conditions, and it 
appeared that the DAL leadership wanted to reconstruct themselves along those lines. 
When it became apparent that the FAO team did not favour that option, seeing benefits in 
DAL remaining a Department of the National Government, we started to encounter 
hostility from DAL. 
 
Resistance from various quarters 
 
The second obstacle in the way of the normal policy-making process was that it proved 
impossible for the FAO team to meet the Minister for Agriculture and Livestock, to get 
his views on the direction he wished the reform of DAL to take. As it happened, for 
political reasons there were two replacements of Minister during the course of the 
consultancy, as the Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta tried to hold his shaky coalition 
together. It is probable, however, that our proposals for reducing the Minister's 
involvement in the affairs of the industry organisations (in appointments to boards, etc) 
would not have been welcomed by the Minister. Obviously, without the support of the 
Minister or the Department's leadership, our reform proposals were going to be in 
trouble. 
At DAL's request, I prepared an Information Paper to inform the National Executive 
Council of the reform proposals, but it was not submitted to them (before I left PNG, at 
least). 
 
During the consultancy, a number of steps were taken to position our proposals within the 
Government's public sector reform initiatives, and thereby make up for the lack of 
political support from the Minister and Department. We held consultations with the 
Minister for Planning and Implementation, and kept the Prime Minister's chief adviser on 
agricultural matters well briefed on our deliberations. Towards the end of the project we 
outlined our proposals to the World Bank representative for PNG, and the Central 
Agencies Coordinating Committee in the Prime Minister's Office which was responsible 
for the public sector reforms which the Bank was supporting. And we invoked the 
processes of the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council (CIMC) - a 
highlevel 
advisory body with mixed representation from the public and private sectors - to 
move the reform proposals forward. 
 
Although we did not enjoy the backing of our client Minister or Department, our 
proposals initially enjoyed a fair degree of support from stakeholders in the agriculture 
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industry. This support, however, was not united. Some in the industry felt that DAL had 
long outlived its usefulness, and that it only used up scarce resources which could be 
better spent at the lower levels of government or by the specialised agricultural 
organisations. A few leaders in the private sector called for DAL to be abolished, but 
others were prepared to accept a Department which had its role confined to high-level 
strategic policy-making and coordination, along the lines the FAO team advocated. All 
industry people were in favour of drastic cut-backs in DAL's staff and funds, but it should 
be acknowledged that many of those working in the specialised organisations were 
"refugees" from DAL, who now competed with it for funds and other resources. 
 
Upsetting established “practice” 
 
When it came to our proposals for imposing a "good governance" regime on the 
numerous industry organisations, we encountered a more concerted opposition. Many 
years of Ministerial interference in the operations of the large cash crop commodity 
bodies had left a legacy of suspicion and distrust of the motives of politicians, which led 
to a "hands-off" mentality to any proposals for reform - even proposals which sought to 
protect the interests of the growers from political interference. Added to that was the fact 
that many board members owed their appointments to Ministerial patronage, and were 
not 
interested in reforms which placed the interests of the growers first. These were fertile 
grounds to breed opposition. 
 
Before long our proposals were being misrepresented, with newspaper reports that FAO 
was proposing that the Government should take over control of all the commodity boards 
and growers' funds, and in particular that the coffee industry legislation should be 
repealed. In fact, we had proposed the opposite - that the boards and funds should be 
safeguarded from political interference, and that the coffee legislation (setting up the 
Coffee Industry Corporation) should be used as the "good governance" model for all the 
other bodies to follow. At a meeting with the CIMC in Mt Hagen, coffee growers staged 
a protest against the reforms, and threats were made to block the Highlands Highway. By 
August 2000, the Minister for Agriculture and Livestock (the third Minister in a year!) 
was assuring the public that the FAO's "controversial reforms" would not be implemented 
"without consulting all stakeholders in the industry". 
 
In June 2001, three university students demonstrating against the Government's public 
sector reforms were shot by riot police in Port Moresby. In the face of rising unrest, the 
Government was obliged to back down on its public sector reform agenda for the time 
being. This left our proposals for reforming administration of the agriculture sector in 
limbo.  
 
Vanuatu 
 
In stark contrast to PNG, in the Vanuatu case there was no problem with lack of a 
political mandate. Not only was there clear Government approval for the preparation of 
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new forestry legislation, but the National Forest Policy which it would implement had 
been the subject of wide community consultation. The main problem we faced in 
Vanuatu came from an unexpected source of "political interference" – a new Prime 
Minister! 
 
“Interference” and Vested Interests 
 
There are, of course, bound to be problems when a Government is replaced mid-term, 
and 
this was the case in Vanuatu. The Government which had approved the National Forest 
Policy in 1998 was removed from office in a vote of no confidence, and a new coalition 
Government led by Mr Barak Sope was in office when we began the project at the 
beginning of 2000. This new Government had, however, signed the Project Document 
with FAO, based on the original proposals and Terms of Reference. Upon our 
commencement of the consultancy, it came as a surprise to find that the Prime Minister 
had authorised a private Australian legal firm and its local business connections to 
prepare legislation creating a special forestry regime for certain land in which they had an 
interest. 
 
This development created a number of problems, in particular: 
 
i. there had been no process of consultation with stakeholders (e.g., the 
customary owners of the land concerned) before the law was drafted; 
ii. there had been no policy approval for the proposed law; 
iii. the Department of Forests and Attorney-General's Office had been required to 
respond to the draft law, and try to iron out problems of a legal and technical 
nature with it - thereby distracting them from the main task of reforming the 
forestry legislation; 
iv. the proposed law would set up a regime which would specifically override the 
general forestry and planning laws in Vanuatu, and impose additional 
demands on Government staff and funds to implement it; 
v. the law would pre-empt decisions on important forestry matters (e.g., forestry 
leases for timber production), which should have been handled under the 
comprehensive forestry law reform which we were about to undertake. 
 
It was extraordinary that, after having just signed an agreement with FAO for the forestry 
law reform project, the Prime Minister should authorise private interests to draft their 
own 
legislation on a major forestry matter. During conduct of the consultancy, we met the 
Prime Minister and the proponents of the special legislation, with a view to persuading 
them to drop the idea and allow us to deal with the matter under the general forestry law 
reform. The Government's legal advisers and the Department of Forests made their 
opposition to the special law very clear, and senior Government officials objected 
strongly to the lack of proper consultation, the clear conflict of interest involved in letting 
a private company construct its own legal regime, and the way the proposed law would 
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override general forestry, land, environmental and planning legislation. Despite all this 
opposition, however, the proposed law - the Forestry Rights Registration and Timber 
Harvest Guarantee Act 2000 - was passed by the Council of Ministers, tabled in 
Parliament and enacted. 
 
This kind of outside interference in the normal processes of government places great 
strains on the integrity of the system, and relationships between Ministers and public 
servants. In the result, we were required to consider the options of either repealing a law 
only passed a few months beforehand, or letting it stand as an anomaly within the general 
forestry system. In the end, the Government decided to let the anomalous law stand. 
 
As it happens, the Sope-led Government itself was overthrown in a vote of no 
confidence in May 2001 by a coalition of parties led by Mr Edward Natapei, but the 
new Forestry Act was passed by Parliament despite these political ructions. 
 
V. LESSONS LEARNED? 
 
What lessons can be learned from the contrasting experiences of these two consultancies? 
In both cases, FAO was asked to field teams of consultants to carry out Terms of 
Reference agreed with the host Governments, and a common methodology was 
employed. It involved regular meetings with a high-level Steering Committee, 
widespread consultations with concerned bodies in the public and private sectors, 
preparation of discussion papers for local consideration between the team's visits to the 
country, and a major workshop at which stakeholders were brought together to debate the 
reform proposals. Based on all these inputs, final recommendations for reform were sent 
by FAO to the Government for its consideration. In Vanuatu's case, this process 
produced an outcome in the form of new forestry legislation in their Parliament. In 
PNG's case, by contrast, the proposed reforms have stalled. 
 
One lesson is to reaffirm a basic point - that aid projects cannot be used as a substitute 
for a government's policy-making role. The main problem in the PNG case began before 
the law-making stage, in that policy decisions had not been made on certain fundamental 
issues, in particular, what should DAL's role be for the future? This was left for the 
consultants to propose, and there was strong disagreement between the major 
stakeholders over the answer to that question. The leadership of DAL itself felt that the 
consultants should implement its wishes - an outcome which would have satisfied DAL 
but no-one else. Without DAL's support, however, the consultants' reform proposals 
could only proceed if some other body in PNG's decision-making process took them up. 
 
This raises the wider matter, of the difficulty involved in getting a mandate for change in 
the contemporary Pacific. The days when political parties produced their manifestoes 
before elections, as a policy platform for government, seem to be long gone. In any case, 
the fact that governments in recent times have frequently changed not as a result of 
elections but mid-term, following opportunistic switches by members of party allegiances 
and votes of no confidence, renders policy-making less important to a government than 
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shoring up its support. In the Vanuatu case, the mandate for change had its base in the 
major effort made to involve the community - from the village up - in developing the 
forestry policy. While costly and laborious, this process afforded a high degree of 
legitimacy to the legislative proposals which implemented the new policy. On the other 
hand, the then Prime Minister was able to push through a forestry law which had no such 
legitimacy, and indeed was opposed by all the senior Government officials most 
concerned. This shows that solid preparation, while it improves the chances of a reform 
negotiating the policy and law-making shoals, is neither sufficient nor essential to 
achieving that result. 
 
There are other ways of gaining a popular mandate for reform, where the subject is one 
of major interest and importance to the wider community. Most Pacific Island countries 
have provision in their laws for setting up commissions of inquiry, with power to 
investigate particular matters and report to the Government with recommendations for 
action. This method was used with some success in PNG, when in 1973 the Commission 
of Inquiry into Land Matters was given the task of recommending policy responses to the 
major land issues facing the country on the eve of its independence. Backed by the 
authority of that report, major land law reforms were implemented during the 1970s. 
Since then, land law reform in PNG has been much more difficult, as the fate of the 
World Bank-inspired customary land registration proposals of the mid-1990s shows. In a 
taste of what was to come, the Government at the time was forced to back down on its 
proposals by student demonstrations, the burning of Government vehicles and threats of 
disorder in the Highlands. What this means, of course, is that countries cannot replace 
outdated laws - in PNG's case, land laws which go back to the colonial period, when 
priorities were very different and public consultation practically non-existent. 
 
Another reform mechanism is the law reform commission, provided for in a number of 
independence Constitutions. Like commissions of inquiry, however, these too seem to 
have fallen into disuse. Recent crises in Pacific Islands states have prompted a rethinking 
of their systems of government. In difficult policy areas - like land, forestry and 
agriculture - the challenge is to find ways of combining a high level of public involvement 
in policy-making with the practical ability for governments to bring laws into effect. 
That, thankfully, is a challenge for a political scientist, not a lawyer. 
 
